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THE PRESS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
AN ESSAY ON THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AND
THE LANGUAGE OF FIRST
AMENDMENT THEORY
Lee C Bollinger*

I would like to explore in this essay one aspect of the contemporary
American debate over the theory of freedom of speech and press. The subject I want to address is this: whether the principle of freedom of speech
and press should be viewed as protecting some personal or individual interest in speaking and writing or whether it should be seen as fostering a collective or public interest. Sometimes this issue is stated as being whether
the first amendment protects a "right to speak" or a "right to hear," though
in general the problem seems to be whether we should conceive of the principle as securing speech against government intervention without regard to
the potential benefits that speech offers for the larger society, or rather only
because of them.
·-.
These alternative statements of the purposes of the first amendment
were present at the very beginnings of our modem free speech jurisprudence. Thus, we have Zechariah Chafee's early summary description of the
purposes of the first amendment:
The First Amendment protects two kinds of interests in free speech. There
is an individual interest, the need of many men to express their opinions on
matters vital to them if life is to be worth living, and a social interest in the
attainment of truth, so that the country may not only adopt the wisest
course of action but carry it out in the wisest way. I
Brandeis' concurring opinion in Whitney v. California 2 is another survey of
first amendment functions that appears to encompass the two conceptions. 3
What is interesting about the development of first amendment theory is
that these two characterizations should eventually come into deep conflict.
With Chafee and Brandeis, for example, it seemed possible to point to these
differing purposes without having to choose between them, or at least not
all that much really turned on which one was chosen. In time, however,
some people began to insist that a choice had to be made. Alexander
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.S. 1968, University of Oregon; J.D. 1971,
Columbia University. - Ed.
1. Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 33 (1941).
2. 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
3. "Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make
men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should
prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means." 274 U.S. at
375.
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Meiklejohn's essay, "Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government,"4
published in 1948, seems to have been the turning point.
In that essay, Meiklejohn denounced the theory that the first amendment served to protect any kind of "individual interest" in speaking and
insisted that its only function was to secure the collective interest in hearing
all speech relevant to the democratic process. In words that are now familiar, Meiklejohn stated that "the point of ultimate interest is not the words of
the speakers, but the minds of the hearers," and, "[w]hat is essential is not
that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said."5
In due course, this way of talking about free speech and press - as
serving a public interest - came to dominate first amendment discourse.
Over the last two decades, especially with cases involving the press, the idiom of the first amendment has taken a full turn in the direction of finding
an identity between the principle of free speech and the advancement of the
collective good. 6 The logic that we routinely encounter posits that we have
free speech because the society is better off receiving the information and
ideas that come from open expression in an uninhibited atmosphere.
Still, there has been a strong resistance movement to this way of thinking about free speech and press.7 Professor Ronald Dworkin, for example,
labels the "individual right" perspective an approach based on "principle,"
and the "public interest" perspective an approach based on "policy," arguing that the latter will lead to a weakening of first amendment protections:
Suppose the question arises, for example, whether the Freedom of Information Act should be amended so that the Disease Control Center is
not required to make its reports available to reporters, or whether the
Atomic Energy Commission should be allowed to enjoin a magazine from
publishing an article that might make atomic information more readily
available to foreign powers. The public's general interest in being well
informed argues against confidentiality and for publication in both cases.
But the public also has an interest in infection-free hospitals and in atomic
security, and these two kinds of interests must be balanced, as in a costbenefit analysis, in order to determine where the public's overall interest
lies. Suppose that in the long term (and taking side effects into account)
the public would lose more overall if the information in question were
published. Then it would be self-contradictory to argue that it must be
published in the public's interest, and the argument for free speech, on
grounds of policy, would be defeated. 8
It is preferable, Dworkin continues, to see this as a "genuine conflict" and
not a "pseudo conflict between two aspects of the public's interest that may
be dissolved in some judgment of its overall interest." 9 By "genuine con4. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
5. Id. at 25.
6. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587-88 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633-34 (1975).
7. See, e.g., B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS vs. PUBLIC ACCESS 31-36 (1976); L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 12-1, at 577-79 (1978); Dworkin, Is the Press Losing the First Amendment?, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Dec. 4, 1980, at 51-52, 57.
8. Dworkin, supra note 7, at 52.
9. Id.
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fiict" Dworkin means we should "take free speech to be a matter of principle," as a guarantee that "individuals have the right to speak, not in order
that others benefit, but because they would themselves suffer some unacceptable injury or insult if censored," 10 and pit it against the "competing
interests of the community as a whole." 11 Then, "[u]nless that competing
interest is very great - unless publication threatens some emergency or
other grave risk - the individual's right must outweigh the social interest,
because that is what it means to suppose that he has this sort of right." 12
But what exactly is the objection here? Is it that more speech will receive protection under a speaker's rights approach than under a public good
approach? For the moment we may put aside the problem of whether the
speech in question ought to be protected (a proposition we ought not simply
to assume) and still wonder whether it really is simply a question of the
scope of the first amendment that is the basis of the objection to the public
interest perspective. The matter is not without complexity, and some of the
things I shall say in due course bear on it, but it may be noted at the outset
that it is hard to imagine real cases in which the same results could not be
reached reasonably by both the speaker's rights and the public interest perspectives. In any event, we might well ask whether even if there will be
some differential in the actual scope of first amendment protection for
speech activity in society there are not other reasons why we should be wary
of the public interest approach to the first amendment. It is to that question
that I wish to tum our attention in this essay.
Before proceeding with the inquiry, I would like to address two preliminary matters. The first is to distinguish the issue we address here from one
other that is also involved in current discussion of free speech theory and
that is sometimes tangled up with the individual interest/public interest debate. In particular, we must keep in mind that the debate over the individual rights versus public interest orientation of free speech is independent of
the dispute over whether the function of free speech should be conceived of
as tied to the search for truth generally or, more narrowly, to the operation
of the democratic political system. It is, in other words, quite possible to
envision free speech as being related to the system of self-government and
yet to see it as protecting the "individual right" of each citizen to participate
in the process of political decisionmaking, instead of, as Meiklejohn did, as
protecting the collectivity in receiving the information it needs to make
good and wise decisions. The point is that the connection between the concept of free speech and the subject matter of the speech protected under it is
separate from the question of whose interest - the individual's or the society's - is ultimately being advanced. In this sense, then, both Chafee and
Meiklejohn conjoined two separable matters. Chafee, for example, defined
the "individual interest" in personal terms (speech "on matters vital to them
if life is to be worth living") and the "social interest" in terms of arriving at
and implementing the best political decisions.
Finally, I should add a word of explanation as to why this essay can be
considered relevant to this volume, dedicated as it is to Eric Stein. I have
10. Id. at 51-52.
11. Id. at 52.
12. Id.
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two considerations to suggest in support of the essay's inclusion. The first is
a belief, though I cannot at this point be sure, that the American experience
in this area is parallel to that in other countries, notably those of Western
Europe. As I look at decisions like the famous Sunday Times13 case of the
European Court of Human Rights, I see a striking resemblance to the idiom
employed by American courts in their efforts to develop a free press jurisprudence.14 That decision, like our New York Times v. Sullivan, 15 strikes a
tone for thinking about the press that resonates with ours, focusing on the
relationship between the concept of free press and a democratic system of
government and the role of the press as mediator between the government
and the people. My hope, therefore, is that the discussion of this essay will
provide an interesting comparative case study.
My second reason is entirely personal: Eric Stein has been a patient and
wise colleague. His interest in international human rights, stemming as it
does from a profound sensitivity to the dilemmas confronting those ideals
in contemporary life, has been inspirational. For me, therefore, anything I
have to say on this subject seems related to him.

I
The thesis I wish to advance is quite simple to state. It is this: The
characterization an advocate selects to explain or justify a "right" is really
best understood as reflecting a general, and complex, identity desired by the
advocate and a relationship between the advocate and others in the society.
What is truly significant, therefore, about the shift in justification of first
amendment press rights to a public interest idiom is to be found in an exploration of the identity being proffered for the press (by itself and others)
and the proposed relationship with other members of the society that that
identity would establish.
No group of people, of course, has a single "identity" or "relationship
with others," any more than a single individual does. It is always a matter
of a mixture of identities, one of degree and emphasis. But the degree and
emphasis can be critical in determining the shift of behavior - as it would
be if university professors came to think of themselves primarily as teachers
13. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (Ser. A, No. 30), 2 E.H.R.R. 245 (Eur. Ct. Hum.
Rts. 1979), digested in 1979 Y.B. EUR. CONY. HUM. RTs. 402.
14. (F]reedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic
society; ... it is applicable not only to information or ideas that are favourably received
or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend,
shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population.
These principles are of particular importance as far as the press is concerned. They
are equally applicable to the field of the administration of justice, which serves the interests of the community at large and requires the co-operation of an enlightened public.
There is general recognition of the fact that the courts cannot operate in a vacuum.
Whilst they are the forum for the settlement of disputes, this does not mean that there can
be no prior discussion of disputes elsewhere, be it in specialised journals, in the general
press or amongst the public at large. Furthermore, whilst the mass media must not overstep the bounds imposed in the interests of the proper administration of justice, it is incumbent on them to impart information and ideas concerning matters that come before
the courts just as in other areas of public interest. Not only do the media have the task of
imparting such information and ideas: the public also has a right to receive them.
2 E.H.R.R. at 280 (1979).
15. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

April/May 1984]

The Press and the Public Interest

1451

instead of as writers and scholars. Furthermore, as with any way of thinking, or identity, what we are speaking about here cannot be reduced to a
few paragraphs, and I do not propose to try to do so. But we can begin to
elicit some of the critical, and perhaps obvious, elements involved and so at
least provide the preparations for future explorations.
What, then, is being proposed in this regard, when representa!ives of the
press defend the rights and powers of the press in terms of serving the "collective" or "public interest"? In a sense, the answer is fairly apparent. The
press is defining itself as the supplier of "what the public wants," which in
most instances will be defined as the information and ideas the people will
use to exercise their roles as citizens, consumers, investors, entertainmentgoers and the like. But there is usually something more, for something
must be added to explain why the press should be free to attend to the
public's needs. The press is saying it is "responsible," that it can be trusted
to handle the power it wields; that it will be honest, straightforward, balanced, fair and decent.
These virtues may seem too general and universal to be of any help in
understanding what is happening to the press within today's legal world,
but the selection of justifications for power and status is actually quite
broad and the choices made within that range are revealing. Consider alternatives: The press might very well claim its rights on the basis, not that it
is generally good, but that it is simply a survivor of the marketplace like any
other business; that journalists possess the knowledge, expertise and professional training that make them uniquely capable of performing this social
function; or, to take other historically common justifications of power, that
the press is the contemporary bearer of an aristocratic heritage, or perhaps
even possessed of a divine mandate. Most important, the press is no longer
asserting that what it does is nobody's business but its own. Its very arguments in self-defense concede its potential for inflicting individual and social harm, as well as the legitimacy and importance of self-restraint in the
exercise of its powers.
Now, a question of some importance is this: Just why should the press
have turned to this particular method of self-justification? Here, again, I
think the answer is built into the structure of the American press, and in
particular into the convergence of two very well-known phenomena:
namely, the increased capacity of the media to reach larger and larger audiences and the simultaneous decline in the number of people who control the
existing outlets.
The most significant development in the press in the twentieth century,
besides its increased capacity to reach so many people, has been its growing
concentration. The steadily dwindling number of newspapers in the cities
across the country, a trend which has now resulted in there being only a
handful of cities in which there is any genuine competition, has been noted
and bemoaned by many, but little has been done to reverse the process.
Nonetheless, the "power" of the press has become a focus of rather constant
attention and, like any locus of unchecked power within the society, has
made the press a constant target for criticism and cries for reform. Concentration of control within the press raises the most profound issue for its
continued freedom from public control: Can we continue to live with a
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concept of liberty for the press when the circumstances under which that
liberty was originally conceived have changed drastically?
To observe the enhancement of the power of the press and its growing
concentration is of course to tread a well-worn path. The reality of the phenomenon pointed to is indubitable; whether a remedy is required, and what
that remedy might look like, are matters open to reasonable difference of
opinion. These, however, are not my immediate concern. All I wish to do
here is to suggest that we try to trace a linkage between this highly significant issue of the legitimacy of the press's power and social position and the
language it regularly uses in defending its constitutional claims.
It is the enormously enhanced position of social power wielded by current members of the mass media that mandates a self-presentation in the
language of the "public interest." When the potential for social harm is so
augmented, when inevitably there will be doubts about whether the original
conditions justifying an expanded range of liberties have been irrevocably
altered by succeeding events, it behooves those who sit in the positions of
control to adopt a posture that minimizes the risks of harm with promises of
good behavior.
Ironically, the very institution that the press has turned to for support of
its liberties has itself suffered from similar problems of legitimacy. The
court system - and, of course, especially the Supreme Court - is the one
political institution in our federal structure that lacks an uncomplicated
democratic pedigree, and this uncertainty about its status in relation to the
other two branches has, as everyone knows, been the cause of seemingly
endless challenges to its actions and equally endless attempts to account for
its role in American politics. I am not interested here in either recounting
these debates or in trying to add to them. What is important for my purposes is the fact that they exist and that they establish an atmosphere in
which the exercise of judicial power is of uncertain legitimacy.
Just as we do with the press, therefore, we find the Supreme Court commonly characterizing its function as that of protecting the people and their
democratic sovereignty against the government, in spite of the reality that
democratic processes are being regularly upset in the enforcement of constitutional liberties. There is, then, a convergence of interest between both the
press and the courts in turning to a collective, or public interest account of
their jointly exercised powers. The most striking example of this convergence in the modem case law is New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 16 where
the fragility of both the press and the Court were being tested by Alabama's
use of libel actions against desegregation speech. There is evident in the
case a feeling of mutual vulnerability and joint dependency. In any event,
that coincidence of interest produced our modem idiom of freedom of
speech and press - the idiom of Meiklejohn and the "public interest" orientation of the first amendment.
In seeing this convergence of interests between the press and the Court,
we are also in a better position to understand the more modem divergence
between these same two institutions. It is of course a known fact of life that
the transition from the Warren Court to the Burger Court has meant a soft16. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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ening of the promised protections arising out of the Sullivan pact between
the press and the Court. But as has been repeatedly pointed out, the press
has won as well as lost in the Burger court, although the clamor from the
press over its losses has frequently proclaimed nothing short of a total judicial abandonment of the first amendment. At times, in fact, the reaction of
the press has been so extreme and exaggerated that even the moderate and
liberal members of the Court (notably Justice Brennan) have felt compelled
to depart from the protocol of judicial nonparticipation in public debate in
order to chastise the press for indulging in a kind of juvenile overreaction to
its defeats.17
I do not wish to defend these overreactions of the press, but I do think
they have at their core a legitimate concern, though it is not really the practical consequences of actual decisions that have gone against them. The
real problem many members of the press have with the Burger Court, I
suspect, has less to do with the results and more to do with the characterization of the press by the Court. Though we frequently overlook it, the courts
- and, here again, especially the Supreme Court - perform a dual function: They resolve actual disputes and make law, but they also articulate a
vision or set of visions about how to think about the world in which we live.
In this latter function the courts are opinion-makers, speakers in the marketplace, in a very literal sense. One can debate just how great an influence
the Court has on shaping the attitudes of the American people - I for one
would estimate it, relative to other speakers, as being fairly high - but
there seems to me little room for denying its having any role altogether.
This means that even when the Court reaches a "favorable" result it can
simultaneously undermine its value for the press by the way it speaks about
the press.
This is precisely what happened in one of the most favorable press decisions, Miami Herald v. Tornillo. 18 Split into two parts, the argument of the
Miami Herald opinion reads like the meanderings of a divided personality.
In the first the press is described as excessively concentrated and monopolistic, as being fundamentally altered from the press that the Framers
thought was in need of special protections, and so on. 19 In the second part,
the decision gives the impression that the "rights" of journalists and editors
are sacrosanct territory in our society, worthy of our trust while the government is not. 20 Always ambiguous, however, the opinion, even at the end,
may be read as saying that the press is bad but unfortunately there's nothing we can do about it - a reinforcement of the troublesome theme developed in the first part of the opinion.21
17. See Address by William J. Brennan, Jr., 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173 (1979).
18. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
19. 418 U.S. at 247-54.
20. 418 U.S. at 254-58.
21. 418 U.S. at 258 ("It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of ...
[the editorial] process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free
press as they have evolved to this time.")
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II
But what is the explanation for the concerns so frequently voiced about
the shift to thinking about press rights (and more generally, about free
speech rights) in terms of the advancement of the public interest? Here I
think we must try to understand what happens to an institution that embraces an identity of being a servant of the public interest.
Of course, not every group of individuals or institution will necessarily
react in the same way to the same self-characterization; differences can be
expected to manifest themselves depending upon the functions performed
by the group or institution, its former identity and the characteristics of the
people involved. Generalizations about probable consequences are, therefore, not in order. But we may still ask what is to be feared in vesting the
institution of the press with the self-image of being the agent, or representative, of the "public"?
The problem is the risk that the press will come to think of itself as
possessed of a kind of indefinite but powerful mandate to ferret out and
rectify wrongs in the society and in doing so will end up either performing
what have until now been primarily official functions, but without the restraints we have so carefully built into the official processes, or actually
exceeding the boundaries of legitimate official action. Perhaps there are
already indications that this has occurred.
When, a few years ago, the television show, "Sixty Minutes" produced a
program to examine the propriety of some of its journalistic techniques in
uncovering fraudulent, deceitful and illegal behavior in society, it displayed
an unfortunately commonly encountered attitude among journalists.
Whether it is proper to engage in illegal activity in order to discover how
easy it is to do so, to employ false identities to gain access to privately run
business operations as a means of uncovering fraudulent and improper
practices, to use the technique known as the "ambush interview" in which
people are suddenly confronted, while the cameras are rolling, with the accusations of wrongdoing - these were the types of techniques practiced
and (with one exception) defended by the producers of the show. What was
interesting, and in some degree disturbing, about the self-critique was not
the practices themselves but the general attitude that lay behind the defense
of their use. It was clear that "Sixty Minutes" regarded itself as essentially
a kind of law enforcement agency, vested with the mission of detecting and
disclosing improper behavior in the society. Yet, despite having undertaken this self-appointed task, the "Sixty Minutes" people did not seem to
see, let alone properly assess, the relevance of many parallel limits that we
routinely impose on the official system of civil and criminal law enforcement. Quite obviously, both the presumption of innocence and the privilege against self-incrimination, to take but two examples, are elemental
bulwarks of our system of criminal justice. They stand guard against what
we have come to think of as inherent biases in our thinking that detrimentally skew our approach to ascertaining the guilt or innocence of those
charged with wrongdoing. Yet neither were raised as potentially relevant
guideposts to thinking about the parallel issues in a system of journalistic
criminal justice.
This of course is not to say that precisely the same rules that govern
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official behavior ought to govern unofficial activities such as journalists engage in, nor, certainly, that the press ought not to be engaged at all in ferreting out wrongful conduct. The point is simply that there are serious risks of
injustice and improper behavior whenever anyone - official or unofficial envisions for themselves a mandate to expose and rectify the wrongdoing
within the society. And, a self-conscious acknowledgement of the limits of
one's capacity to do good, matched with a comparable recognition of one's
capacity to inflict serious harm, is a minimal condition of undertaking such
an enterprise. Yet that is precisely the problem for the press: Institutionally disinclined to see itself as a semi- or quasi-official organization, for to
do so seems a partial acknowledgement of the relevance of the limitations
imposed on official behavior, it is nonetheless inclined to cast itself as the
true representative and protector of the people's interests.
III
The concern, however, is not limited to problems with the behavior of
the press alone. It also extends to the potential behavior of the public, and
in tracing this concern we can learn something especially interesting about
first amendment thinking generally and perhaps even something useful for
dealing with that perennial quest of fashioning a viable theory of the first
amendment.
The problem with the public interest perspective is that it seems to place
control over speech freedom in the hands of the public itself. One of the
things that makes a public interest reference attractive in free speech rhetoric is, doubtlessly, that it is largely an abstraction - it assumes a body of
people so large that consultation with them over the attribution is usually
impracticable. But not always. Sometimes "the public," speaking as a
democratic majority, can make its will known quite clearly and firmly, and
when it does, anyone who has claimed the status of the public's agent will
be duty bound to accept its will.
This would seem to be a reasonable fear behind any turn to a justification of press rights based on the idea of serving the public will. But the fear
should be clarified: The problem is not simply in what a "fair" evaluation
of the competing public "interests" (both in the benefits of the speech itself
and in the avoidance of the costs of that same speech) will yield in terms of
the scope of protection for speech activities but in obtaining any "fair" evaluation in the first place. In short, the real concern underlying the objections
to the public interest idiom is that it seems to vest in the public a real choice
- as the ultimate party in interest - over what level of protection for
speech we will have, and the public is not to be trusted with exercising that
choice wisely. In the face of this reality, the preferable course to some has
been to turn to a position in which free speech is defended as a matter of
"right" or "principle," that is, as something beyond the realm of discussion.
In fact, the deeper one probes into the strategic thinking in the first
amendment area, the more one discovers - and, depending on one's viewpoint, to one's discomfort - that a good deal of first amendment "reasoning" can be understood as directed at making reconsideration of any first
amendment issue virtually unthinkable. Perhaps the most striking example
of this methodology is Justice Black's well-known insistence that the Ian-
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guage of the first amendment ("no law") foreclosed any independent examination of the first amendment protections the Court was extending. Along
with the repeated invocation of "the Framers' intent" and the seemingly
settled "history" of the free speech and press clause, the "no law" technique
represents a familiar fortress strategy for presenting the first amendment.
I do not wish here to explore at length the merits and demerits of these
ways of thinking and talking about the first amendment, but only to clarify
the key concerns behind the objections to the public interest idiom. It
should be observed, however, that this desire to protect something you
value by making its abandonment or modification unthinkable is one of the
primary motivations behind the suppression of speech in the first place. It
does seem anomalous, to say the least, for the process that condemns that
practice to employ it itself. The real difficulty, however, is more than making sure you practice what you preach, but in identifying and understanding what the ultimate purposes of the first amendment really are. It would
seem that among those ultimate purposes ought to be that of developing the
capacity of mind to avoid such patterns of deception, both of others and of
oneself.
At the very least, we should begin with a distinction in our thinking
about the public interest perspective on the first amendment. The problem
with it may be thought to rest, not in the general idea that the first amendment should be thought about in terms of its advancement of the social
good, but in the unfortunately narrow range of considerations we presently
associate with the social good. A "cost-benefit" analysis for the first amendment is undesirable, in other words, because of its stunted conception of
what the first amendment is all about. When Dworkin objects to the public
interest perspective through his examples of the Disease Control Center and
the Atomic Energy Commission, he defines the free speech interest of the
public as that of "being well informed." This is of a piece with most contemporary talk about the advantages of the first amendment: It brings us
the information we need to make decisions as citizens and truth-seekers and
the like. This is a pragmatic style of thinking of a most limited kind, and,
importantly, it seems to neglect consideration of a more fundamental symbolic and aspirational role for the first amendment. The solution, however,
is not to retreat from the task of understanding and articulating just how
society is better off with a first amendment such as our intuitions tell us we
ought to have, to a kind of uncommunicative stance of "principle," but
rather to engage in that task of enlarging our conception of the relevant
considerations.
The public interest perspective, therefore, is dangerous because our theory of the fust amendment is itself too narrow and undeveloped.
IV

I have argued that the best way to understand the prevailing "theory"
about the first amendment serving a "public interest," and the concerns that
many people seem to have with that theory, is to see it as a kind of shorthand expression of a set of identities for the various participants involved in
free speech litigation (the courts, the public and the speakers, which of
course includes the press) and of the various relationships between these

April/May 1984]

The Press and the Public Interest

1457

parties. Pursuing that line of inquiry, I have suggested that we see it as the
language of those whose exercise of power (be it informational or judicial)
is precarious - that is to say, of questionable legitimacy - and as embodying a kind of promise to behave in certain ways in exercising that power
(responsible, objective and the like). And I have indicated what I think is at
the root of our fears about individuals and institutions that assert the authority to act on behalf of someone assumed to possess ultimate sovereignty, especially when the principle is most often a dissembling
abstraction.
The interest of what we find in such an inquiry is accentuated by a comparison with other roads not taken; that is to say, of other means of representing oneself as holding power legitimately. It is noteworthy, I think, that
the press has thus far chosen not to rest its case on any claim of special
expertise in acquiring and disseminating the "news." There is perhaps
some suggestion of expertise in the modem development of the concept of
"editorial autonomy," which has appeared in a few cases like Miami Herald.22 But it has not been more explicit than that.
This omission is of a piece with a more general ambivalence within the
American press about its identity. The press in this country appears to be
somewhat uncomfortable with any sense of itself as an institution made up
of "professionals." The ambiguous status of journalism and communications departments within our universities bespeaks a more widespread division within the press about its status.23 In large measure, the issue seems to
be where the press stands: as an outsider, reporting on and criticizing
events within, or as an insider, subject to the same standards and expectations that govern those who are themselves participants in the events covered by the press. More than most groups (compare lawyers, for example)
the press is in conflict over its relationship to the world on which it regularly
reports.
Here, I think, lies another part of the attraction to the dissenting rhetoric
of "speakers rights." For it is the identity offered by that "theoretical" account of free speech protections that seemingly best matches the underlying
need of many journalists to think of themselves as totally independent people, unconstrained by the expectations regularly imposed on those who inhabit the realms of officialdom and the professional class. It is the image of
the wily, Odyssean reporter, employing clever techniques and staunchly
maintaining his or her independence, that is so much at odds with the "public interest," "right to hear" idiom of contemporary first amendment
discourse.
What this also demonstrates, in part, is that the identities connected
with our first amendment idiom are really always going to be subject to
evaluation in terms of their advancement of the "public interest." It is not
22. "The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials whether fair or unfair - constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment." Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
23. See, e.g., Journalism Educators JJehate Strategies, Technology and Ties lo the Media,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1984, at 11, col. l (city ed.); Salmans, TV's Newscasters Give Low Marks
to Newcomers, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1984, § 2, at l, col. I.
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the case that one identity "serves" the public interest and the other does not;
though the behavior under either identity will differ in significant respects,
each will be judged ultimately by the measure of its general value for the
society.
What is of special interest in the change in first amendment idiom towards the "public interest," "right to hear" language is the progressive shift
within the American press towards a professional identity. We can expect, I
think, to see a continuous movement within the press towards taking on the
characteristics of the other professions, including a more developed system
of ethical self-evaluation. The recent demise of the National News Council24 only highlights the absence of - and need for - an institutional organization within the press vested with the task of systematically addressing
the complex issues that an increasingly powerful and professional press will
inevitably have to face.

24. See National News Council Will Dissolve, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1984, at 11, col. I (city
ed.).

